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Purpose:  The aim of this study is to determine whether reverse mergers are 
a viable alternative to IPOs in going public. This is done by 
measuring buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for each group 
and comparing them for a three year period. Furthermore, we look 
at factors that might explain discrepancies.  
Methodology:  We have carried out a long-term event study with a deductive 
approach. Our empirical material is mainly made up of secondary 
data, which we analyze using the buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
method. The data is then tested via t-tests and confidence intervals.  
 
Theoretical perspective:  This research is based on previous studies done on IPOs and 
reverse mergers from all around the world, but mostly USA. 
 
Empirical foundation:  Our research is based on data from companies on the Swedish 
stock exchanges. The data was obtained from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream as well as from Skatteverkets webpage.  
 
Conclusions:  We find no significant difference in RM and IPO performance in 
terms of BHARs. Therefore, RMs are a viable option and they 
should be considered a legitimate alternate means of going public, 
despite the bad reputation.   
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Titel:   Reverse Mergers - An Alternative to IPOs 
 
Seminarie datum:  2014-01-17  
 
Kurs:   FEKH89 Finance: Degree Project Undergraduate level, 15 ECTS  
 
Författare:   Gabriel Hahn, Lennart Lindrud, Amra Ramic  
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Syfte:  Syftet med denna studie är att utreda huruvida omvända förvärv är 
ett hållbart alternativ till att bli börsnoterat jämfört med IPOs. 
Detta görs genom att mäta överavkastning för båda grupperna på 
tre års sikt och sedan jämföra dem med varandra. Dessutom 
undersöks faktorer som kan förklara eventuella diskrepanser.  
 
Metod:  En eventstudie med deduktiv ansats har utförts, där vi analyserar 
det empiriska materialet med hjälp av BHAR metoden. Empirin är 
sedan testad via t-test och konfidens intervaller. 
 
Teori:  Denna studie bygger på tidigare forskning som gjorts på IPOs samt 
omvända förvärv runtom i världen. Det mesta är dock baserat på 
studier i USA. 
 
Empiri:  Vårt arbete baseras på data av företag noterade på Svenska börser 
och handelsplattformar. Den empiriska datan insamlades via 
Thomson Reuters Datastream funktion samt från Skatteverkets 
hemsida. 
 
Slutsatser:  Ingen signifikant skillnad påvisades mellan omvända förvärv och 
IPO företagens överavkastning. Vi drar slutsatsen att omvända 
förvärv är ett legitimt alternativ till att ta sig in på börsen, trots det 
dåliga ryktet.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The year of 2008 will long be remembered as the year that triggered chaos, with crashing 
stock markets, huge bankruptcies and bailouts around the world. Books are, and continue to 
be written about the cause and effects of that crash. While stockowners experienced a 
harrowing journey, firms also suffered, in particular the ones in need of capital injections. The 
ones seeking to go public via an initial public offering (IPO) found that the market had 
completely dried up. The capital markets were at a standstill and would continue to be for 
years. In 2008, over 100 companies cancelled their IPO plans in USA alone (Feldman, 2009). 
What were their options? 
Fast forward to December 2013, and zoom in to a small Scandinavian nation; Sweden. A 
Swedish company by the name of Candyking had planned to undertake an IPO on the 
Swedish stock market (Nasdaq OMX). According to the company, there had been a growing 
interest among investors to participate. However, the day before the planned IPO Candyking 
sent out a press release informing the public that two fires had broken out in their supplier’s 
factories. Profits would be SEK 3.5 million lower than previously forecasted. The offering 
was to be delayed a few days for that reason. However, disclosing negative news at this 
crucial stage in the process was enough to scare many investors away, and eventually, due to 
negative press, Candyking thought better of it and aborted the offering completely.  
Obviously, the release of bad news was ill-timed, but with 2012 revenues at SEK 1.8 billion, 
the SEK 3.5 million was a drop in the bucket and should not have affected the long-term 
valuation of the company much. In fact, Candyking stated that “even with these negative 
effects during the fourth quarter, the company expects a higher underlying operating profit in 
2013 than 2012” (Placera, 2008). So why did Candyking choose to abort their IPO? We 
venture to guess that perhaps they would not have received the amount they sought, or the 
valuation they wanted. Regardless, they were at the mercy of external forces.  
This chapter provides background information on the subject and explains our problem 
formulation in regards to earlier research. 
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So what is the lesson here? IPOs have some apparent flaws, certainly with regards to factors 
outside the companies’ control like bull/bear markets and investor irrationality. When 
recessions occur and the IPO market shuts down, alternate routes for going public are needed. 
Furthermore, firms would prefer those routes to be less sensitive to irrational behavior due to 
short-term problems.  
One such possible alternate method is the so-called reverse merger (RM), a little-known 
option that could serve as a complement to the existing system of going public, with 
advantages and disadvantages of its own.  A reverse merger is when a private company 
purchases control of a public company and after merging into it becomes publicly traded. 
Most of the time the public company is just a shell with no real ongoing business, but this is 
not always the case (Feldman, 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In figure 1, the private operating company purchases the majority of the public shell 
company’s shares, gaining a controlling interest in the public shell. As stated by Feldman 
(2009), at this point the public company’s board of directors can be replaced with that of the 
private firm. The two firms have merged, becoming one entity but with the assets and 
business operations of the private operating firm that wanted to go public.  
 
 
Private operating company  Public shell company  
Public operating company  
Figure 1 - Illustration of public-private reverse merger 
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Although the RM method is not well known, it might surprise the reader to know that some 
very large and profitable companies have used it, including the following (Feldman 2009): 
• Berkshire Hathaway Inc 
• Jamba Juice, Inc 
• Texas Instruments Inc 
• Blockbuster Entertainment  
• The New York Stock Exchange  
• Radio Shack (Tandy Corporation) 
If respectable firms like these used it, it may be worthwhile inspecting the method closer. 
Unfortunately, RMs have long had a bad reputation due to the prevalence of fraud involved in 
deals made in the past, especially in the 80s in USA. This was mostly done through shell 
companies that went public with the sole purpose of raising money, which they then used to 
pay themselves salaries and fees, with no real business going on.  In USA, the stigma has 
started to decrease, leading to a surge in the number of RMs undertaken since 2000 (Feldman 
2009). Feldman mentions several possible reasons for this change:  
 IPOs have been hard to undertake since 2000, so alternate methods are sought 
 Since 2004, a new group of investors have discovered reverse mergers, so called PIPE 
investors (Private Investment in Public Equity). These investors refer to it as “public 
venture capital”. 
 The SEC and financial community have begun to see reverse mergers as a legitimate 
way to go public. 
Of the 39 companies we found that have gone public through a reverse merger in Sweden 
between 2000 and 2010, almost 25% have gone bankrupt or been delisted.  A simple Google 
search on reverse mergers will reveal how negative the public opinion is in Sweden. The title 
of an article written in Aktiespararen 2011 perhaps sums up the public view of investors, 
“Omvänt förvärv banar vägen för bedragarna” which translates to “Reverse mergers pave the 
way for fraudsters” (Bernholm, 2011). The harsh critique is justified in that particular article, 
but how often is that the case? Is the negative view warranted or is the RM option a viable 
one? 
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1.2 Problem Discussion 
 
Much has been written on IPOs regarding the characteristics of companies that choose this 
route, as well as their subsequent performance on the market. Research on the subject has 
often focused on the four puzzles of IPOs: short-run underpricing, long-run 
underperformance, high costs and the wave-like pattern of IPOs.  
 For example, Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994) found that IPOs around the world tend to 
follow economic patterns, with many being undertaken during good times and few being 
undertaken during downturns. Interestingly, RMs are not as sensitive to market fluctuations as 
IPOs, aside from extreme events such as the financial crisis in 2008. That makes them a 
viable option in bad markets, but does not necessarily limit them to those situations. A study 
in USA comparing RMs and IPOs found that there is a negative correlation between the two 
in terms of number of deals occurring per year (Losardo & Zhu, 2012).  This implies that 
firms do in fact sometimes use RMs as a substitute for IPOs.  
 The long-run underperformance puzzle of IPOs mentioned above is interesting from an 
investor’s point of view and is documented by Ritter in 1998. He found that IPOs appeared to 
be overpriced, which lead to long-run underperformance of stock returns as the price 
eventually corrects itself. Another theory presented is that the IPO itself is not important; 
instead the reason for going public is what drives the long-term negative performance.  
While IPOs continue to be the most common way to go public, the number of RMs is rising, 
especially after 2000 (Feldman, 2009).  So why are RMs important, aside from their growing 
popularity? There are a number of reasons, according to Feldman. Many small companies 
could benefit from being publicly listed but cannot undertake an IPO, partly because they do 
not live up to the high-growth standards that investment companies often seek and partly 
because the fees are exorbitant. RMs are cheaper because they do not require expensive 
underwriters and the process of going public is quicker because it does not go through the 
same regulation processes. The disadvantages are that there is less funding and the shares are 
not traded frequently. The details of RMs will become clear later in this report. For now, 
suffice it to say that the method is interesting to investigate further, specifically in regards to 
how these companies perform as compared to IPO companies.  
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The long-run performance of RM companies is not that well documented and in the few cases 
where studies have been done the results have varied, at least from country to country. Here 
are a few examples: 
 In USA the results are mixed. One study showed that 42% of RMs are delisted within 
three years (Adjei, Cyree & Walker, 2008) and another, earlier study found that 54% 
did not survive the first two years (Gleason, Rosenthal & Wiggins, 2005).  
 A more recent study by Losardo & Zhu (2012) found that RMs outperformed the S&P 
500 over a three year period.  
 In Canada, a study found that the RM and IPO performance is similar long-term but 
very poor when compared internationally, with firms underperforming American RMs 
and other countries significantly (Carpentier, Cumming & Suret, 2012). The authors 
contribute this to the lax regulations in Canada as compared to the USA.  
 Lastly, a report in UK finds similar performances between IPOs and RMs, indicating 
that there is little difference in the quality of firms opting for the two different methods 
(Rosenboom & Schramade, 2007). 
 
In Sweden, research on the subject is scarce. There have been studies performed on individual 
firms and also on small samples in the Swedish market but none that we can find measuring 
the long-run performance over a three year period or more. There are a couple of likely 
reasons for this. There are not as many RMs in Sweden due to the comparatively small size of 
the market here and also the reputation is still bad so the growing trend seen elsewhere has not 
yet materialized. There are also no databases with easy access to all the companies that have 
taken this route which makes the data search time-consuming. Nevertheless, it is interesting to 
find out how these companies did long-term in order to ascertain if they should hold a place in 
our markets, and if their performance differs from IPOs what factors might be the likely cause 
of that.  
The preceding discussion leads us to the following problem formulation:  
 How have companies in Sweden that carried out reverse mergers performed over a 
three year period as compared to IPOs?  
  If there is a difference, what are some factors that can explain that difference? 
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1.3 Purpose 
 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether RMs are a viable alternative to IPOs in 
going public. This is done by measuring buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for each 
group and comparing them during a three year period. Furthermore, we look at factors that 
might explain discrepancies. 
1.4 Target Group 
 
The target group for this paper is mainly people with a basic knowledge of business, 
economics, or finance. These include teachers, students, professors; and possibly investors 
seeking an investment strategy. Furthermore, we hope to provide firms with information on an 
otherwise obscure method of going public. 
1.5 Demarcations 
 
This paper will examine and compare Swedish companies that have undertaken RMs and 
IPOs in the time span 2000 to 2010. We see a time period of 10 years as a sufficient time to 
examine this subject as this time span should include a whole business cycle which is usually 
three to eight years (Konjunkturterminologi, 2011).  
We wish to examine the long-run performance for three years, which means the latest starting 
date that can be used is 2010 (the study starts in 2013). This study is limited to using BHAR 
when measuring the long-run returns which has been deemed to be an adequate measure when 
determining the viability of the firms. The study is limited to adjusted stock returns (which 
adjusts for capital events). Additionally, we only use companies registered on the stock 
markets NGM, Aktietorget, NASDAQ OMX, and First North.
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2 Literature Study 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Stock Exchange 
 
The type of stock exchange a company chooses to go public on says a good deal about a 
company. Smaller stock exchanges such as Nordic Growth Market (NGM) Equity and 
Aktietorget attract smaller, more growth-oriented firms that are in need of capital in order to 
keep expanding and developing. There are a number of listing requirements for each stock 
exchange. On the NGM stock exchange you are required to have at least 300 stock owners 
where each stock owner has shares valued at a minimum of 5000 SEK, and where at least 
10% of the votes and 10% of the stocks are spread amongst the public (NGM, 2013). 
However, as NGM is one of the two regulated market places in Sweden it has stricter listing 
requirements than Aktietorget and First North. 
NASDAQ OMX is the other regulated market place, and has the strictest requirements for 
listing companies. Firms have to prepare a prospectus that must be approved by relevant 
authorities. Furthermore, the company must undergo legal examination that covers several 
areas. There are fees that must be covered and proofs of profitability over a certain amount of 
years must be provided. These are some of the requirements companies must fulfill before 
listing. Further details can be found on the NASDAQ OMX official website. The main thing 
we want to highlight is that NASDAQ OMX is the strictest exchange to list on, and is aimed 
at companies that are stable and can show a profitable past. Even if a company fulfills the 
requirements, NASDAQ OMX retains the right to decline a company’s listing application if it 
can be deemed to harm the credibility of the stock exchange (NASDAQ OMX Rulebook, 
2014). For future reference, note that we use NASDAQ OMX and Nordiska interchangeably 
in the rest of this paper.  
Aktietorget exists to aid young growth companies in gaining access to investor capital from 
the public. Aktietorget changed on the 29th of March 2007, it is no longer a regulated market 
in the sense that NASDAQ OMX and NGM are. The general listing requirements of 
Aktietorget are that there has to be at least 200 shareholders holding shares with a value of 
In this chapter we will present and discuss theories and practical information that is 
relevant to our subject. We discuss the different stock exchanges, IPO puzzles, and RM 
characteristics. 
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circa SEK 4,400 each. Aktietorget has chosen to enlist an external disciplinary committee and 
has organized market surveillance even though it is not required, “in order to resemble a 
regulated market” (Aktietorget, 2014).  
First North is NASDAQ OMX’s growth market, specifically for smaller, developing 
companies. It does not have the same regulations that are set on other markets but is regulated 
by the rules set forth by First North; a company on First North is considered to be a more 
risky investment than companies on the regulated markets mentioned above. However, an 
added benefit of less stringent rules is that it allows for the listed companies to be freer in 
their development and more focused on their own activities. The general listing requirements 
are that a company must have a “sufficient amount of shareholders holding shares with a 
value of at least 500 EUR and if at least 10% of the share class to be traded is held by the 
general public” (First North Nordic – Rulebook, 2013).. Furthermore, a company must fulfill 
the company description, sign an agreement with a certified adviser, and must meet the 
organizational requirements (First North Nordic – Rulebook, 2013).  
Before moving on we want to emphasize that the actual rules for each market aren’t that 
important in our analysis, rather it is the differences between them that we are interested in 
due to the possible effect that might have on long-run performance.  
2.2 Initial Public Offerings (IPO) 
 
Through an initial public offering a private company can become a public one as the shares of 
a company are sold out to the general public and traded on the stock markets. Public offerings 
thereafter are called seasoned equity offerings, or SEOs. IPOs are often made by small 
companies that need new capital to be able to expand or grow. 
 
Advantages of going public are, among other things: greater liquidity, easier access to capital, 
public awareness of the company, and the spreading of risk for the owners. However, there 
are some disadvantages as well. Finansinspektionen (FI) requires all publicly traded 
companies to publish all information that could have an influence on the quotation of the 
stock (ÅRL, 1995:1554). Additionally, accurate financial statement reports need to be 
released regularly, a process that takes time and is costly due to audit fees. 
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There are four main problems with going through an initial public offering, often referred to 
as the “four IPO puzzles” (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013). 
 
1. IPOs are underpriced in the short term; they have on average had positive abnormal 
returns the first day the stock is sold, and has been observed all around the world. It is 
often young firms that go through with an IPO. It is very uncertain how their business 
will develop and this uncertainty won’t attract risk averse investors unless the share is 
underpriced (Rock, 1986). 
 
2. New issues are highly cyclical, with more deals done in bull markets. It is pretty 
obvious that there would be a higher need for capital when there are more growth 
opportunities; the surprising part is the extent of the difference (Ritter, 2011). 
 
3. IPOs are expensive, with both direct and indirect costs. Chen & Ritter (2000) found 
that for IPOs, the direct costs average 11%. On top of that there are indirect costs 
associated with underpricing by the underwriters.   
 
4. The long-run performance (3-5 years) after an IPO is on average poor. The theory of 
adverse selection suggests that “bad” products are bought because of asymmetric 
information.  Ritter (1991) attributes the long-run underperformance mostly to market 
timing, where certain industries are doing well and so many companies in that sector 
go public during that time. Then the price is corrected with time. Another theory is 
that the reasons behind the IPO are what matters most.  
 
2.3 Reverse Mergers, a Comparison 
 
In this section we will explain what a reverse merger is, why it might be beneficial for some 
firms and what circumstances warrant its use, as well as what constitutes a shell company in 
the RM process.  
 In his book, Reverse Mergers, David Feldman (2009) describes the reverse merger process 
in-depth and explains why it is a viable option for small firms. Much of the material in this 
section is taken from his book. Surprisingly, this is one of the only books written on the 
subject and although it is aimed at an American audience it is nevertheless relevant even to 
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the Swedish market, as the process is similar. Differences between the two are mainly found 
in regulatory requirements and legislation. These are not trivial and as stated previously have 
been found to have a significant effect on long term performance of newly listed firms 
(Carpentier, Cumming & Suret, 2012). In our study however, we only compare Swedish 
companies to each other so the differences are irrelevant in this particular case.  
A reverse merger is when “a private company purchases control of a public one, merges into 
it, and when the merger is complete becomes a publicly traded company in its own right” 
(Feldman, 2009). If the public company has no real ongoing business then it is often referred 
to as a “shell”. The reasons for going public this way will become apparent as we go through 
the advantages and disadvantages below. Feldman names seven advantages and two 
disadvantages of RMs when compared to IPOs. We cover each briefly. 
2.3.1 Advantages vs. IPOs 
1. Lower cost. 
One of the puzzles of IPOs is the high underwriting costs (Ritter, 1991). This is 
avoided in the RM process. Feldman states that RMs are much less costly and the total 
cost can often be pre-determined. In his experience, most RMs cost less than $1 
million whereas an IPO will cost at least three or four times that much, excluding 
underwriting commissions (2009). For a RM the biggest cost is generally the price of 
the shell.  
 
2. Speedier Process 
A RM takes two to three months; an IPO takes nine to twelve. There are fewer steps 
and fewer parties involved. There is also no disclosure document that needs to be 
approved by the SEC. 
 
3. Not Dependent on IPO Market for Success 
As discussed earlier, IPOs follow a wave-like pattern and prefer to go public when the 
economy is doing well (Ritter, 1984). This is not an issue for RMs, because they are 
not sensitive to the market and that makes them a good choice in any market 
condition.  
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4. Not Susceptible to Changes from Underwriters Regarding Initial Stock Price 
Underwriters can choose to change the price at the last minute if the market sentiment 
drops just before the IPO. Cancellations of IPOs are also not uncommon. 
 
5. Less Time-Consuming for Company Executives 
IPOs take time, time that could be used to run the business. A RM is less time- 
consuming as mentioned earlier and no new investors need to be found. That means 
more time for business decisions.  
 
6. Less Dilution 
Feldman argues that in a RM less money is raised, during a time when the company 
supposedly is undervalued. It is better to raise money when the stock price is higher, 
because it doesn’t dilute ownership. Theoretically, new companies on the public 
market should trade higher after six months or so if the business grows. That is a big 
“if” however. Additionally, underwriters tend to try to take in as much money as 
possible without regard to how much the company doing the IPO actually needs (what 
you might call a “good” problem). This is because the underwriter takes a percentage 
fee of what is raised.  
 
7. Underwriters Unnecessary 
Feldman mentions this one because underwriters try to make a company look as 
profitable as possible before the IPO, which sometimes means selling off new 
subsidiaries that have not yet started making money. RMs do not have that problem as 
there are no underwriters involved. 
2.3.2 Disadvantages vs. IPOs 
1. Less Funding 
RMs bring in less money than an IPOs but that may not be relevant criticism of the 
method. Nothing stops the company from taking in new capital once they are public. 
This may even be beneficial if the stock price is higher at that point.  
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2. Market Support is Harder to Obtain 
Underwriters will for some time after the IPO of a firm act as market makers, as well 
as trying to hype the stock during and after the offering. This often results in what 
Feldman calls a “pop in the stock price” which is unlikely in a RM because no one is 
covering the stock. A rise is more likely to come from years of improved performance 
rather than what he calls “manufactured support”. 
To sum up, the main situations in which RMs are preferable to IPOs is when firms are small, 
markets are down, initial injection of money is not the main aim, time is of importance, or 
simply when hefty fees wish to be avoided. These are definitely compelling reasons to 
perform RMs.  
2.4 Shell Companies 
 
The target firms of RM deals are typically unprofitable, so-called shell companies. A shell 
company is a company registered with the FI (Finansinspektionen – equivalent to the U.S 
Security and Exchange Commission) and is overall emptied of its real assets. If these add up 
to at least half of the disposal price the company is classified by Sweden’s government 
(Proposition 2001/02:165) as a shell company. Shell companies typically trade on smaller 
markets. A shell company might have been founded simply for the purpose of merging with 
other companies or because they might have been forced to sell off all their assets due to 
bankruptcy. Shell companies are not the focus of this study so no detailed description is 
needed but in certain studies a distinction is made between deals involving shells and others 
that are more strategic in nature, like mergers. We do not make that distinction here.  
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3 Earlier Research in Regards to Methodology 
 
 
 
 
The calculation of abnormal returns in order to gauge a stock’s performance in a post-event 
window has been common over the past two decades, as table 1 illustrates. Mainly, these 
event studies have been performed on corporate events such as IPOs and Seasoned Equity 
Offerings (SEO). There are three commonly used methods of measuring stock returns, 
namely: BHAR, CAR, and the Fama-French three factor model, all of which will be 
discussed. 
3.1 BHAR 
  
A study by Gleason, Jain & Rosenthal (2006) is one of the few that utilize a quantitative 
approach to analyze the long-run performance of RMs vs IPOs. They collected data that 
included 119 confirmed RMs and 22 self-underwritten (SU) IPOs listed on the New York, 
NASDAQ, or American stock exchanges between 1986 and 2003. They then gathered sample 
IPOs that would act as matching companies, and these were value weighted, meaning that the 
category they matched IPOs, RMs, and SUs by was the firm’s market capitalization at the 
time of the RM or SU event. They research the long-run market value performance by 
calculating buy-and-hold returns for the RMs and SU for 6, 12, 18, 24, and 36 months. The 
buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) was then calculated as the difference between the 
sample RM or SU firm holding period (HPR) and the HPR for the matching IPO firm. By 
doing this, Gleason, Jain & Rosenthal (2006) analyze the long-run returns of the private 
company that undertakes a RM to go public from a shareholder’s perspective, and by using 
the matching principle the authors identify whether or not the shareholder would have been 
better off investing in a traditional IPO.  
They tested the significance of the mean and median using t-tests and Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
tests at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. The researchers found that the long-run performance of RMs 
outperform their matched traditional IPO firm in the short-run and performed similarly in 
three years after going public. The researchers conclude that this may not be all that surprising 
due to the fact that so many RMs and SUs were undertaken during the dot-com bubble. 
In this chapter we will highlight and discuss earlier research methods that are applicable 
to this study, as well as motivating why we chose the one used in this paper.  
19 
 
However, what is interesting is that from an investor perspective one would not have 
underperformed if investing in a RM during the study’s time period.  
Loughran & Ritter (1995) used a sample of 4,735 companies going public (IPO) in the United 
States between 1970 and 1990. They calculated the BHAR annually for 5 years starting from 
the first year after the event date. They then use a matching firm for each issuing company 
and match them by market capitalization. The firm with the closest to but higher market 
capitalization is chosen as a matching firm for the issuing company. If one of the matching 
firms delisted, Loughran and Ritter (1995) chose to switch over to a second matching firm on 
the date it was delisted. By doing this they manage to remove survivorship bias. The authors 
argue that matching by industry as well as market capitalization would not be possible due to 
the fact that there would not be enough firms and they would have to re-use the same 
matching firms. They found when looking at the 3 year BHAR mean of the IPO and the 
matching firm that the IPOs underperformed; which matches what earlier studies such as 
Ritter (1991) concluded on the subject. When looking at a 5 year BHAR mean the IPOs 
underperformed even more. Loughran & Ritter (1995) conclude that IPOs during this time 
period have been poor long-run investments for investors. 
 
Ritter & Welch (2002) research a sample of 6,249 IPOs in the time period 1980 to 2001. They 
tested the long-run performance in order to determine if the theory of long-run 
underperformance is valid. They do this by testing the IPOs BHAR relative to a benchmark 
and use a value-weighted portfolio as the benchmark, as well as matching the IPOs to control 
firms, testing both methods. They found that the BHAR mean for IPOs when matched with 
the portfolio was -23.4% from 1980-2001 whereas when the IPOs were matched with the 
control firm the BHAR mean was -5.1% which shows a big difference in performances. 
However, both methods resulted in IPOs underperforming in 3 years.  
 
Barber & Lyon (1997) argue that event studies should calculate abnormal returns by using the 
simple buy-and-hold return on a sample firm minus the simple buy-and-hold return on a 
reference portfolio or a matching firm. They identify three biases: new listing, rebalancing, 
and the skewness bias and explain how to remove these biases. We will go through how the 
biases are removed in section 4.4.1. The use of a control/matching firm by size and book-to-
market ratios result in more efficient test statistics in all different kinds of scenarios that 
Barber & Lyon (1997) can imagine. They argued that the control/matching firm method 
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results in more efficient test statistics than a reference portfolio because it reduces the three 
biases. Their data showed that when using the control/matching firm the mean BHAR and 
bias’ are overall much closer 0 than when the reference portfolio is used.  
 
3.2 Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
 
An alternative to the use of BHAR would be the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). Barber 
& Lyon (1997) argue that summing daily or monthly abnormal returns introduces bias in the 
event study as well as positively biased test statistics due to the three biases mentioned earlier. 
Ritter (1991) was among the first researchers to argue that CAR and BHAR can be used in 
order to answer different types of questions. The difference between the two methods is that 
CAR disregards the effect of monthly compounding whereas BHAR includes it. Barber & 
Lyon (1997) test this by randomly sampling 10,000 firms between July 1963 and December 
1993. Then the 12-month CAR and BHAR is calculated using the CRSP 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX equally weighted market index for each of the 10,000 samples 
which were then sorted into 100 portfolios of 100 samples each. Additionally, they calculate 
the mean difference between the CAR and BHAR and then test the difference against the 
mean annual BHAR of each of the 100 portfolios. This showed the differences between CAR 
and BHAR, and when the annual BHAR was less than 13%, the CAR was on average almost 
5% greater than the BHAR. However, as the BHAR increased, the CAR decreased 
significantly. This difference was a result of monthly compounding, and shows how using 
CARs will result in a biased prediction of long-run abnormal stock returns. 
 
3.3 The Fama-French Three-Factor Model 
 
The method developed by Fama & French (1993) is applied by regressing the sample firm’s 
abnormal monthly returns after it has performed an event such as a RM, on three different 
factors: a market factor, a size factor, and a book-to-market factor.  
 
According to Fama & French (1993), as a result of there being four variables (with the 
dependent variable included) in the regression, one needs at least “five observations of 
monthly returns post-event. This creates a survivor bias among remaining sample firms.” The 
second crucial disadvantage that the three-factor model presents is that when doing a long-run 
performance event study, the variables in the regression are considered stable. Since the three-
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factor model approach assumes that a company’s size, market factor, and book-to-market 
variables do not change over time it gives a skewed view of the firms’ performances. That is 
why we have chosen not to use this approach for this paper’s event study.  
 
In order to summarize the different methods and the benchmark that they match firms with, 
we have constructed table 1 below.  
Author(s) Corporate event 
studied 
Return 
Benchmark 
Event 
period 
Ritter (1991) Initial public 
offerings 
-Market index 
-Size/industry      
-control firm 
-Size portfolio 
60 months 
Loughran & 
Ritter (1995) 
Initial public 
offerings and 
Seasoned equity 
offerings 
-Market index 
-Size control firm 
-Three-factor 
model 
60 months 
Barber & Lyon 
(1997) 
None -Size control firm 
-Book-to-market 
60 months 
Ritter & Welch 
(2002) 
Initial Public 
Offerings 
-Size control firm 
-Book-to-market 
36 months 
Gleason, Jain & 
Rosenthal 
(2006) 
Reverse mergers 
Self underwritten 
IPOs 
Initial public 
offerings 
-Size control firm 36 months 
Table 1 - A summary of previous research analyzing long-run abnormal stock return
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4 Methodology 
 
 
 
 
Our event study takes a deductive approach since it is based and supported by earlier research 
and existing theories. In a deductive approach one tries to prove a hypothesis via empirical 
means, as opposed to an inductive method where “theory is the outcome of the research” 
(Bryman & Bell, 2007).  There has been some critique of deductive reasoning, one of which is 
that a study does not use all variables that are involved and oversimplifies the reality of a 
situation. We are aware that there is a risk our study has a small population or that we have 
not included enough variables, and in order to compensate for this risk we have performed an 
in-depth review of previous research. See section 3. 
4.1 Quantitative Research Method 
 
The purpose of this study, as previously discussed, is to measure the difference in long-run 
performance of RMs and IPOs by the use of BHAR. Therefore, it is natural for this paper to 
take on a quantitative research approach, and as argued by Bryman & Bell (2007) a quantitive 
approach involves the gathering of data and the testing of theories. There has been some 
critique that a quantitative approach does not give an accurate connection between the 
research and everyday life, that it shows a “static view of social life” (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
We hope that by using BHAR, which was designed to calculate returns from an investor’s 
perspective we reduce that problem.  
4.1.2 Gathering of Data 
 
This study is based on secondary data which is most common when performing a quantitative 
research method, as long as the sources are reliable. We found the firms that have completed 
RMs by looking through press releases, companies’ financial statements, and stock history on 
Skatteverket. For the gathering of the stock returns we have made use of the Thomson Reuters 
Datastream database, using the monthly adjusted returns which are adjusted for capital events. 
We deem this database to be reliable as it is one of the world’s biggest financial databases. 
For listing and de-listing dates of both RMs and IPOs, as well as tracking the name changes of 
In the following chapter we present and explain what type of event study this paper utilizes, 
as well as an explanation of the sampling and gathering of data. We cover the validity and 
the reliability of the study, and go through the performance measurement. Lastly, the 
statistical methods are explained and we present our null hypothesis.  
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companies throughout the event study’s time period, we have used Skatteverket’s stock 
history which is a government-owned entity. It is continuously updated and as a public 
authority we deem it to be a reliable source.  
4.1.3 Data selection 
 
4.1.3.1 Sample selection 
 
Statistical studies always carry a risk that the sampling is not an accurate representation of the 
whole population. Since there is no database or other resource showing which companies 
have performed RMs, we had to rely on manually going through press releases, newspapers, 
and Skatteverket’s stock history to find firms that match our criteria. There is no guarantee 
that we have found every company that has performed a RM during the study’s time period 
due to bankruptcies and de-listings. However, we are convinced we have found nearly the 
entire population of RMs which consists of 36 companies.  
We found all companies that have performed IPOs on the following stock exchanges: NGM 
Equity, NASDAQ OMX Nordic, Aktietorget, and First North. This was done through their 
official websites. In order to create a more manageable group of IPOs, we randomized 36 
IPOs, the same number as the RMs we found. We chose to randomize the IPOs from each 
stock exchange so that they correspond with the number of RMs for each respective 
exchange. For example, if two RMs were performed on Aktietorget, two IPOs were picked at 
random from Aktietorget. This is known as randomized stratified sampling, and was the best 
method in our opinion, of creating a comparable, yet manageable population.  
There were some companies in both sample groups that de-listed during the event study time 
period. However, we chose to include them up until the de-listing date in order to make sure 
we would not create any kind of survivor or selection bias. Seven IPOs and three RMs de-
listed. Another three firms were excluded due to incomplete data in the RM selection. The 
attrition rate is small enough however that a skewed result is unlikely. These three are not 
included in the 36 RMs mentioned above. As a result of our selection, this event study ended 
up with 36 RMs and 36 IPOs and the same number of control firms. 
4.1.3.2 Event study time period 
 
A 10 year time period is chosen, from 2000 to 2010. This is to ensure that there is enough data 
to reach accurate and reasonable conclusions. BHAR is calculated at 36 or 60 months in most 
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studies, but we chose to calculate it for each of the 36 months in order to gain a more 
complete overview of the returns.  
4.2 Reliability 
 
When conducting a scientific research the reliability of the study is of great importance. 
Authors Bryman & Bell (2007) state that the reliability of a study is a measure of how easy it 
is to replicate, meaning that if the reliability is high, the outcome would turn out exactly the 
same. In order to ensure that our study has a high reliability, we have used trustworthy 
sources when gathering data and try to give a thorough understanding of our methodology.  
We have also tested the historical stock prices we used by taking random samples from our 
data and matching it to other sources such as the official NASDAQ OMX Nordic to make 
sure it is accurate. In order to ensure replicable experiment results, a list of the companies 
used in this study is included in Appendix I.  
4.3 Validity  
 
According to Bryman & Bell (2007), the validity of research can most easily be defined as the 
result’s legitimacy. The method used here to calculate abnormal returns is a respected and 
well-founded method, and ensures that our study calculates what it is supposed to, resulting in 
high measurement validity. When seeing how RMs and IPOs perform in the long-run we 
make sure that we have a sound internal validity, meaning that we can clearly see the 
relationship between the two groups’ performances. Finally, by describing in detail the 
process of how our samples were created we make sure there is an external validity for the  
event study (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
4.4 Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns 
 
The way to measure BHAR is quite simple, Barber & Lyon (1997) explain that you buy a 
stock at a certain period in time and then hold it for a set period of time. The BHAR is the 
difference between the long-run holding period return (HPR) for a sample firm and a 
benchmark asset, in this case the control/matching firm.  
The HPR is calculated as follows: 
𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 =  𝑃2−𝑃1𝑃1     (1) 
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Where 𝑃1 is the stock price at the time of listing and 𝑃2 is the stock price at the end date. The 
control firm’s stock is theoretically bought at the same time as the sample firm and is held for 
exactly the same amount of time.  
𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 =  𝑃2−𝑃1𝑃1     (2) 
In order to calculate the abnormal returns between the sample firm and the control firm, we 
find the difference between 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 and 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 as shown by formula 3. 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 =  𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 −  𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  (3) 
BHAR is calculated for the two groups, RMs and IPOs, for each of the 36 months. When 
performing our statistical tests to see the data’s significance, we test it annually at the 12, 24, 
and 36 month marks as done in earlier research (Ritter & Welch, 2002; Barber & Lyon, 1997; 
Gleason, Jain & Rosenthal, 2006).  
4.4.1 Matching Concept 
 
This event study matches each sample firm, the RMs and IPOs, to a control firm. This method 
was chosen over a reference portfolio because according to Barber & Lyon (1997) it removes 
three biases that may occur.  
Firstly, the new-listing bias which argues that in event studies of long-term BHAR, the 
sample firms have no returns prior to the event, while the companies that make up the index 
portfolio may have been listed prior to the event date. This bias is taken away due to the 
control and sample firm being listed in the same event year.  
Secondly, with an index portfolio there is a rebalancing bias that appears due to the compound 
returns with daily or monthly rebalancing. The returns of a matching firm are compounded 
without rebalancing. Therefore, there is no bias.  
Thirdly, a skewness bias appears with an index portfolio because BHARs are generally 
positively skewed. This bias disappears with matching firms because they are just as likely to 
experience large positive returns. 
When choosing how to match the sample firm to the control firm, there are certain matching 
principles that can be used. For example, Ritter (1991) chose to match companies by size and 
industry, whereas Gleason, Jain & Rosenthal (2006); Barber & Lyon (1997); Ritter & Welch 
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(1995) all chose to match by size. If we were to match companies by both industry and size 
there would not be enough control firms for our study. One of the troubles we encountered 
was that there were not enough control firms for our population, so occasionally we had to 
resort to using the same control firms. In order to not create any bias, we have not used the 
same control firms within a three year time period. For example, if we used control firm ‘A’ 
in 2003, we did not use it again until 2006 or later. Of the 72 control firms, ten were used 
more than once. 
Name Code 2009-03-02 
NGS NEXT GENERATION SYS. SWEDEN - MARKET VALUE 15355P(MV) 16,11 
SOTKAMO SILVER - MARKET VALUE 28533V(MV) 18,8 
SHELTON PETROLEUM - MARKET VALUE 284518(MV) 21,57 
GINGER OIL - MARKET VALUE 54208J(MV) 30,83 
AURIANT MINING - MARKET VALUE   31,81 
AIK FOTBOLL 'B' - MARKET VALUE 41030D(MV) 42 
LIFEASSAYS 'B' - MARKET VALUE 25732U(MV) 51,34 
PAYNOVA - MARKET VALUE 28546T(MV) 57,43 
GUIDELINE GEO - MARKET VALUE 32556L(MV) 63,39 
HEBI HEALTH CARE DEAD - 10/07/09 - MARKET VALUE 26370R(MV) 76,57 
ARCAM 'B' - MARKET VALUE 295925(MV) 82,37 
AVALON INNOVATION 'B' DEAD - 07/02/11 - MARKET VALUE 681462(MV) 89 
SVERIGES BOSTADSRATTSCENTRUM - MARKET VALUE 32867P(MV) 99,84 
EXEOTECH INVEST - MARKET VALUE 681112(MV) 113,59 
MICRO SYSTEMATION 'B' - MARKET VALUE 278760(MV) 173,66 
BETTING PROM.SWEDEN - MARKET VALUE 688611(MV) 339,72 
OBDUCAT 'B' - MARKET VALUE 697302(MV) 379,59 
GLYCOREX TRANSPLANTATION - MARKET VALUE 282393(MV) 573,09 
MERTIVA - MARKET VALUE 888181(MV) 803,93 
Figure 1 - Matching a RM to a control firm 
Figure 1 is an example of how we matched sample firms to control firms. We took the RM 
firm Auriant Mining and found the closest firm in terms of market capitalization, in this case 
Ginger oil. This process was repeated for each of the 72 sample firms. Ritter (1991) matched 
companies by always taking the closest higher firm. However, for our study it would create 
too big of a gap in size, therefore the closest firm was always chosen regardless. 
If the chosen control firm happened to delist during the 36 month period, it was replaced by 
the next closest firm in terms of size on that same date, also done by Ritter (1991). Only one 
such case was encountered. 
4.5 The t-test and Confidence Intervals  
Barber & Lyon (1997) tested BHARs with a two sample t-test. A t-test is used to calculate 
whether the mean of two groups of data are statistically different to each other (Körner & 
Wahlgren, 2006). In our main event study we want to test whether or not there is a significant 
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difference in RM and IPO mean BHARs. We take the mean BHAR for all the RMs and the 
mean BHAR for all the IPOs annually and apply t-tests for year one, two, and three as shown 
in formula 4.  We also test the mean BHAR difference for RMs and IPOs via confidence 
intervals for all 36 months as shown in formula 5.  
𝑡𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 = (𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑀 − 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂)/(𝜎𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅/√𝑛)    (4) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑀,𝐼𝑃𝑂 = (𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅��������𝑅𝑀 − 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅��������𝐼𝑃𝑂) ± 𝑧 ∗ �𝑠𝑅𝑀2𝑛𝑅𝑀 + 𝑠𝐼𝑃𝑂2𝑛𝐼𝑃𝑂  (5) 
𝜎𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 is the standard deviation of BHAR and 𝑛 is the number of observations. According to 
Körner & Wahlgren (2006), when testing a hypothesis you should determine the significance 
level prior to the analysis. We chose a 95% significance level, as is common for this type of 
study, which means that there is a 5% probability that the null hypothesis is rejected even if it 
is true. Z is set to 1.96 which is the value used at the 95% significance level. Most statistical 
programs do a t-test rather than a z-test but the difference is negligible for samples greater 
than 30 and will suffice here as well.  
To get an idea of how IPOs and RMs did in comparison to their benchmarks we also plotted 
confidence intervals for their respective BHARs. That formula is given below: 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 =  𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅�������� ± 𝑧 ∗ 𝑠𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅
√𝑛
      (6) 
Note that we could have just compared confidence intervals for IPOs and RMs; if they 
overlap that would indicate that there is no significant difference. Plotting each set in one 
graph would have made it unclear and we also wanted to analyze each separately.   
4.6 Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis testing consists of formulating a null hypothesis 𝐻0 and an alternative hypothesis 
𝐻1. They are tested against each other through statistical methods and the null hypothesis is 
either accepted or rejected (Körner & Wahlgren, 2006). Our null hypothesis for the main 
event study is that there is no difference between RM and IPO BHAR means. The alternative 
hypothesis is that there is a difference between RMs and IPOs. Ours is a two-tailed test, 
meaning the difference can either be negative or positive.  
As stated by Körner & Wahlgren (2006), when the sample size of the study is large enough,  
n > 30, it is not necessary for the sample to be normally distributed in order to calculate 
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confidence intervals according to the central limit theorem. However, we graph histograms to 
get an idea of what the distributions look like. This will help in the analysis. 
Additionally, 95% confidence intervals are calculated and plotted on a graph for two more 
studies; one on RMs versus their benchmark and the other on IPOs versus their benchmark. 
Applying a t-test to all 36 months would have taken longer than just plotting and observing 
whether or not the confidence interval covers zero. When it does, the null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected. Furthermore, a graph shows potential trends which are useful when analyzing the 
results.  
𝐻0 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑅𝑀 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑠 
𝐻1 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑅𝑀 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅
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5 Analysis and Results 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Observation trends 
The sample in this study is comprised of 72 firms on the Swedish stock market; 36 RM firms 
and 36 IPO firms. The selection is made according to the criteria in the methodology section. 
The full list of RMs and IPOs along with their market capitalizations, date of deals, markets, 
and matching companies can be found in appendix I. 
Table 1 and figure 1 show the distribution of consummated deals for IPOs and RMs 
respectively during our time frame. The IPO data shows a clear drop in the number of deals 
from 2000-2003 due to the IT crash but then picks up and peaks in 2007, only to fall again 
when the financial crisis strikes in 2008. As expected, the IPO volume mimics the market 
trend, peaking when market sentiment is high and dropping when it is low. The number of 
RM deals is too small to draw any conclusions about trends, although there is a large increase 
in 2005 and 2006.  
Aggregate IPOs Aggregate RMs 
Year # of IPOs Year # of RMs 
2000 30 2000 1 
2001 22 2001 1 
2002 12 2002 3 
2003 8 2003 2 
2004 15 2004 1 
2005 33 2005 8 
2006 47 2006 7 
2007 55 2007 4 
2008 24 2008 2 
2009 17 2009 5 
2010 29 2010 2 
TOTAL 292 Total 36 
Table 1- RM and IPO distribution by year 
A regression analysis done by Lhosardo & Zhu (2012) on RMs and IPOs in USA from 2004-
2011 yielded a significant negative correlation between the two groups. Our small sample of 
This chapter will include a description of our data, as well as results and an analysis. It 
starts with trends of RMs and goes on to t-tests and confidence intervals. Lastly, a summary 
and comparison is made on previous research, followed by a critique and limitations. 
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RMs does not allow for a reliable result but we suspect a larger sample would return the same 
result. 
 
Figure 1- RM and IPO distribution by year 
An important aspect of the data is the market cap of the firms. Table 2 shows the aggregate 
market cap for each group and their respective matching companies’ market caps. The 
discrepancy in total aggregate size is due to the limited number of matching companies 
available in each market. As with most studies, the model is not perfect but should be close 
enough to yield accurate results.  
 
Table 2- Aggregate market capitalization 
The observant reader will have noticed that the RMs on average are much smaller than the 
IPOs (SEK 3,745 million vs SEK 29,055 million), especially in the First North and NGM 
Equity markets. The size difference is apparent in other studies as well, (LoSardo & Zhu 
2013; Adjei, Cyree &Walker, 2008; Gleason, Rosenthal & Wiggins, 2005) who all found that 
RM companies tend to be comparatively small in size. Because we compare each group to 
their own matching companies of equal size there is no size bias when comparing BHARs but 
it tells us something about the type of company pursuing this route.  
0
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
IPO
RMs
MARKET Aggregate Reverse Merger Market Cap (Mkr) Aggregate Market Cap Matching companies, (Mkr)
Aktietorget 421.13 443.29
First North 325.97 334.49
NGM Equity 898.56 1206.4
Nordiska listan 2099.2 2102.28
Total 3744.86 4086.46
Market Aggregate IPO Market Cap (Mkr) Aggregate Market Cap for Matching Companies Mkr
Aktietorget 406.47 351.92
First North 1756.76 1814.73
NGM Equity 2443.87 2787.69
Nordiska Lista 24447.5 22394.16
Total 29054.6 27348.5
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We surmise that RMs are not yet a popular way to go public for large companies, which leads 
us to believe that companies undertaking RMs most likely do not qualify for a regular IPO or 
cannot afford one. The effect of those two aspects on performance are of interest to us, as 
differences in regulations have been seen to negatively affect performance due to information 
asymmetry (Carpentier, Cumming & Suret, 2012). For example, we found that NGM Equity 
was the most popular place to undertake RMs and since regulations do differ between the 
market places this may have an effect on performance. Testing each market against the others 
would not be appropriate however, due to the small number of RMs in each.  
5.2 T-test findings 
5.2.1 Testing for normalcy 
Six histograms of the distributions of BHARs for RMs and IPOs at 12, 24, and 36 months 
were created in order to test for normalcy. As a rule of thumb, the normalcy test is not needed 
for t-tests if the sample size is greater than 30 (Körner & Whalgren, 2006). Our sample of 36 
is sufficient, but in order to get a feel for the distribution we plotted them anyway with 
histograms. Histograms allow us to visualize the data and get an idea of what the tests will 
reveal. We include the two at 36 months below, shown in figure 2. The other four can be 
found in appendix II. 
 
Figure 2 – Histogram of distribution at 3 years.  
The distribution is not perfectly normal, and as stated previously does not need to be for our 
tests to be valid. Note that most values are clustered around zero, indicating that values far 
from there are unlikely. Also, the distribution is somewhat negatively skewed, with more 
values being negative than positive. 
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Another criterion with t-tests is for the sample standard deviations to be equal. This was tested 
with an F-test. The F-test is the two-tailed probability that the variances are not significantly 
different.  Table 3 shows the result of that test for 12, 24, and 36 months. None of the values 
are lower than 0.05 so we conclude there is no significant difference in standard deviation. 
However, note that, year two shows a large difference in variance and would have been 
significant at a 90% level. We can now move on to the actual tests. 
 
Table 3 - F-test for RMs and IPOs 
5.2.2 Two-sample t-test 
The delisted companies (three for RMs and seven for IPOs) mentioned earlier in the 
methodology section pose somewhat of a problem when measuring BHAR. They exhibit 
similar characteristics to each other in that they generally did poorly and shortly after delisting 
went bankrupt. In order to deal with the potential survivorship bias this might cause, we carry 
out two separate t-tests comparing BHAR means. One includes the delisted companies (using 
the last known market value after the delisting) and one excludes them (truncated method) 
after they delist. The purpose of this is to determine whether or not the bias changes the 
results. The results are displayed in table 4. The tests are performed at year one, two and three 
at the 95% significance level; the left column shows the results with delisted companies 
included. The right column excludes them (revealing a potential survivorship bias). The null 
hypothesis is that no difference exists between RMs and IPOs. Note the difference in 
observations for each group and year.  
1 Year RM BHAR 1 Year IPO BHAR 2 Year RM BHAR 2 Year IPO BHAR 3 Year RM BHAR 3 Year IPO BHAR
Variance 1.374919301 0.92518546 3.246790735 1.729095467 1.61541233 2.148349889
Mean -0.24 -0.10 -0.19 -0.04 -0.29 0.01
F-TEST 0.246145508 0.066410793 0.403175696
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Table 4 - t-test including and excluding dead companies 
 
The relevant number to look at is the two-tail P value for each year (highlighted in grey). A 
value below 0.05 indicates a significant difference at the 95% level. None of the values are 
below 0.05. We can draw two conclusions:  
1. There is no statistically significant difference in the mean BHARs of RMs and IPOs 
for these three time periods.  
2. The survivorship bias is not large enough to skew the results, at least not to the point 
where the conclusion would change. This means that going forward we can choose 
(includes all companies) Excludes dead companies
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances
ONE YEAR (includes all companies) ONE YEAR (excludes dead companies)
1 år RM IPO 1 år RM IPO
Mean -0.242014 -0.103531 Mean -0.195623 -0.103531
Variance 1.3749193 0.9251855 Variance 1.4176604 0.9251855
Observations 36 36 Observations 34 36
Pooled Variance 1.1500524 Pooled Variance 1.1641807
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 70 df 68
t Stat -0.547866 t Stat -0.356906
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.2927633 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.3611337
t Critical one-tail 1.6669145 t Critical one-tail 1.6675723
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.5855265 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.7222673
t Critical two-tail 1.9944371 1.9944371 t Critical two-tail 1.9954689
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances
TWO YEARS (includes all companies, even dead ones) TWO YEARS (excludes dead companies)
2 år RM IPO 2 år RM IPO
Mean -0.186881 -0.040236 Mean -0.107749 -0.035435
Variance 3.2467907 1.7290955 Variance 3.4508865 1.9434246
Observations 36 36 Observations 33 32
Pooled Variance 2.4879431 Pooled Variance 2.7091195
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 70 df 63
t Stat -0.394443 t Stat -0.177083
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.3472265 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.4300055
t Critical one-tail 1.6669145 t Critical one-tail 1.6694022
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.694453 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.8600109
t Critical two-tail 1.9944371 t Critical two-tail 1.9983405
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances
THREE YEARS (includes all companies, even dead ones) THREE YEARS (excludes dead companies)
3 år RM IPO 3 år RM IPO
Mean -0.288075 0.0089781 Mean -0.286638 -0.061
Variance 1.6154123 2.1483499 Variance 1.7449525 2.6205126
Observations 36 36 Observations 33 29
Pooled Variance 1.8818811 Pooled Variance 2.1535472
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 70 df 60
t Stat -0.9187 t Stat -0.604079
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.1807036 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.2740343
t Critical one-tail 1.6669145 t Critical one-tail 1.6706489
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.3614073 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.5480685
t Critical two-tail 1.9944371 t Critical two-tail 2.0002978
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just one of the two tests (we include them all) without jeopardizing the validity of the 
results.  
The most interesting test result here is for three years, showing no significant difference. This 
implies that RMs did just as well as IPOs in the long run and should be a viable option for 
firms and investors alike. Note however that for each year the mean BHAR was lower for 
RMs than IPOs, raising our suspicions that perhaps there is more to the story. We return to 
this later but first let us look at how the RMs and IPOs performed in comparison to their 
benchmark (matching companies).  
5.3 Confidence Intervals 
Rather than doing a t-test for each month we look instead at the confidence intervals to get an 
idea of how the significance changes over time. When the intervals include zero, there is no 
significant difference.  
5.3.1 RM BHAR Mean 
 
 
Figure 3- Confidence interval for RMs 
Figure 3 shows the mean BHAR including 95% confidence intervals for the RM companies 
from month one through to month 36. The actual numbers can be found in appendix III. Note 
that these are aggregate BHARs starting at different time periods between 2000 and 2010 for 
all four markets; First North, NGM, Aktietorget and Nordiska listan. This will be the case for 
all the diagrams shown with confidence intervals.  
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The 95% confidence intervals all pass through zero, indicating that there is no significant 
difference between the RM companies and their matching companies, despite the distinct 
negative performance after the seventh month. A 90% significance level test (not shown here) 
gave similar results, showing a significant difference only in month 22. The intervals are quite 
wide, more so than they perhaps should be despite the small sample size, given that the RM 
companies consist of almost the whole population for that time period. A few may have been 
missed due to the manual process of finding them but we believe the list to be otherwise 
complete. If true, the mean BHAR values are quite accurate and the confidence intervals 
should be narrower, perhaps even to the point where zero is not included.  
All but the first six months show negative BHAR means. An investor buying an equal amount 
of all the RMs at each starting point during this time period would have seen lower returns 
than if the matching companies had been bought instead, albeit not significantly so.  
This comparison is important because it is of interest to know not only how RMs performed 
in relation to IPOs but also how each group performed in comparison to their respective 
benchmarks. For example, Ritter (1991) attributes long term IPO underperformance to timing, 
where companies mostly prefer going public during what he calls “industry specific fads”. 
RMs on the other hand are not as dependent on market sentiment, they can be undertaken 
even in bad markets and so the risk of overvaluation is decreased and we should perhaps see a 
better relative performance. This did not hold true for the t-tests in figure 4 however. In fact 
the IPOs had higher mean BHARs. A possible reason is that timing is only one of many 
factors affecting the performance; stock trading volume for example has been found to 
significantly impact performance and would act in favor of IPOs since underwriters often 
guarantee liquidity for a certain time after the offering (Lhosardo and Zhu, 2012).  
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5.3.2 IPO BHAR Mean 
Next we study IPOs and compare them to their benchmark.  
 
Figure 4 - IPO BHAR mean confidence interval 
Figure 4 shows the same BHAR diagram as Figure 3 but this time for IPOs during the same 
time period. Actual numbers are displayed in Appendix IV. 
The confidence interval includes zero for all months, which leads us to not reject the null 
hypothesis that the means are equal. There is no clear trend and the values seem to lie closer 
to zero than for RMs, although only five of the months show a mean BHAR above zero. We 
can conclude that IPOs have not underperformed the market at the 95% confidence level for 
this sample and time period. This goes against what Ritter (1991) found for IPOs but is in line 
with other studies, like one we found in Switzerland where IPOs did not underperform 
matching companies when comparing to a small cap index (Drobetz, Kammermann & 
Wälchli, 2005). They attribute the difference to what benchmark is used.  
 
A study done on the Swedish market from 1998-2007 found that IPO firms over a three year 
time horizon underperformed their market index and that the underperformance increased 
over time (Lakkonen & Åkesson, 2007).The benchmark used was the OMX market index 
which does not take into account the market size of IPOs so this further supports the Swiss 
conclusion.   
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A longer time period or larger sample could possibly yield different results here as most 
studies on IPO BHARs are stretched for longer than three years. Taking the full population of 
IPOs would have been optimal but was not possible due to time constraints.  
5.3.3 RM vs IPO BHAR Mean 
 
Figure 5 - Confidence interval difference between IPO and RM BHAR means 
Figure 5 shows the confidence intervals for the difference in means of RM companies and 
IPOs, where a negative number signifies a poorer performance for RMs. This is the main 
event-study in this paper. Actual numbers are displayed in Appendix V. Each interval for the 
36 months includes zero which means the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. However, only 
five months show a positive BHAR and they are clustered around the first six months. Note 
that the confidence intervals are again very wide, which makes the comparison less useful 
than it would have been with a larger sample or lower standard deviation. That problem might 
be remedied in future studies should RMs become a more accepted means of going public.  
We thought it prudent to also compare the mean BHARs of IPOs and RMs in one graph. 
Figure 6 illustrates their respective trends in relation to each other.  
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Figure 6 - Plotted mean BHARs for RMs and IPOs over a 36 month period 
It is clear that RMs (blue line) have done worse than IPOs over time. In all but five cases 
IPOs outperformed RMs. The five times RMs did better all occurred within the first six 
months. Although not significantly different at any point, there is enough of a pattern to 
warrant suspicion that on some level RMs do perform a little worse over time, especially as 
the last month shows a large disparity at 30%.  
One of the factors brought up previously was the size of RMs versus IPOs. However, firm 
size should make little difference in this study because each group is compared to a matching 
group of similar size. Speaking against the size factor is the study by Lhosardo & Zhu (2012) 
on the American market. They found market cap to be a poor predictor of long-run 
performance which if true on the Swedish market would mean there is no size bias.  
Another factor to consider is how each market place might affect the outcome. First North, 
NGM and Aktietorget all have more lax requirements than Nordiska does and so it might be 
interesting to study each individually. These are all grouped together in this study due to the 
small number of RMs in Sweden but it is likely that different regulations do affect the 
performance as was found in Canada (Carpenteir, Cumming & Suret 2012). To discern 
differences we plotted the mean BHARs for RMs and IPOs for each market place in figures 7 
and 8. As can be seen, only the First North market place showed a poorer performance for 
IPOs than RMs, and surprisingly, IPOs showed positive BHARs for all the other markets after 
year two. The graphs further confirm our suspicions that RMs are a little worse off than IPOs 
except in the case of First North, which did extremely poorly in the IPO sample. As far as 
regulations go, a firm choosing the RM method on Nordiska theoretically should do a little 
worse because they bypass the rules that the matching companies cannot. That tendency is not 
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seen in the RM graph, in fact the BHAR means for RM firms in Nordiska end up very close to 
zero and are better off than the other marketplaces. The fewer requirements a firm bypasses, 
the smaller the difference we hypothesized but the graphs show otherwise. Once again, a 
larger sample would have been useful in that a regression could have been performed to 
confirm results here.  
 
Figure 7&8 - Mean BHARS for RMs and IPOs plotted out over 36 months for each market place 
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5.4 Connecting the Dots, Comparison to Previous Studies 
  
Table 5 presents a brief summary on RM studies, most of which have been mentioned earlier. 
There are others, but we felt these were the most interesting and this summary should make it 
easier when analyzing differences in results. They span the whole world and as such provide 
interesting information on possible reasons for discrepancies between nations with regards to 
RM performance.  
Authors Conclusion 
Gleason, K.C., Rosenthal, L.  
& Wiggins, R.A.  (2005) 
“Backing into being public: an exploratory 
analysis of reverse takeovers.” 
(USA) 
Small, young companies typically undertake 
RMs. Short term some gains can be seen but 
long term they usually fail to generate any 
wealth for shareholders. 46% have not 
survived two years. Still, they conclude it is 
an important mechanism, albeit a risky one 
for investors. 
 
Carpentier, C., Cumming, D. & Suret, J-M. 
“The Value of Capital Market Regulation: 
IPOs Versus Reverse Mergers” 
(Canada) 
High listing requirements decreases 
information asymmetry and significantly 
affects long term performance positively. 
Mostly low quality firms choose the RM route. 
They conclude IPOs are better due to more 
regulations but find that in Canada they 
performed similarly. 
 
Adjei, F., Cyree, K.B. &Walker, M.M. 
“The Determinants and Survival of Reverse 
Mergers vs IPOs.”  
(USA) 
Small, young companies with weak 
performance are typical for RMs. 42% of the 
companies delisted in the three year period 
study. 
 
LoSardo, M.J. & Zhu, J. 
“A Further exploration of Reverse Takeovers 
as an alternative to IPOs” 
(USA) 
 Find that RMs did better than the American 
index.  Find that good performance is 
correlated with trading activity. See RMs as 
positive. 
Brown, P., Ferguson A. & Lam, P. 
“Choice between alternative routes to go 
public: backdoor listing vs IPO” 
(Australia) 
Poor long term performance for RMs, even 
short term gains are small and underpricing 
is often present. The RM route is not always 
an easier and quicker way to go and appears 
to not always be chosen by small companies. 
 
Roosenboom, P. & Schramade, W. 
“ Reverse Mergers in the United Kingdom: 
listed targets and private acquirers” 
(UK) 
Long-run performance similar independent of 
listing route. Short-run target returns are 
positive and the bigger the private acquiring 
company relative to the public target is, the 
larger the abnormal returns are.  
 
Table 5- A summary of previous research 
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Performance 
Our study shows no significant difference in BHARs between RMs and IPOs. Of the studies 
above, two have the same outcome, while three do not. Not all studies were focused on 
performance however, like Adjei, Cyree & Walker (2008), who mainly looked at the reasons 
for undertaking RMs in the first place and how many survived. The two studies where RM 
performances matched or surpassed IPOs were done in the UK and USA respectively. 
Perhaps RMs are turning into a more accepted means of going public, making investors less 
likely to eschew them. In USA the SEC has sharpened rules and by so doing improved the 
legitimacy of RMs. If more investors are willing to invest in these companies, the 
performance should improve.  
Size 
The size of the companies taking the RM route was perhaps the most common denominator in 
all the studies. All but one (Australia) found that the companies were small in comparison to 
IPOs. However, as stated previously, a regression by Lhosardo & Zhu (2012) (USA) based on 
market cap revealed no significant correlation to performance. Instead they found that stock 
volume traded the first few days was a good indicator of future performance, the higher the 
better. We find this interesting because theoretically IPOs should have higher turnover of their 
common stock post-event than RMs do, with underwriters acting as market makers. 
Consequently, they should do better over time but that trend is not clear in our case. 
Delistings 
 Fewer companies delisted on the Swedish exchanges than the American one as found by 
Gleason, Rosenthal &Wiggins (2005)  and Adjei, Cyree & Walker (2008) who both saw over 
40% of RMs delisted for three and two years respectively. In Sweden that number is 17% in 
the first three years. While delisting generally involves poor performance for these firms, we 
think it says little about the total performance of RMs as a group. In the mentioned studies, no 
study was conducted for the long-term BHAR.   
Regulation effects  
Our results reveal that RMs did not do worse on Nordiska, as should have been the case if 
regulations play a role in performance. We surmise that they play less of a role in Sweden but 
with the caveat that our sample is too small in each market place for a good judgment to be 
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made. In Canada there was a significant difference for how the firms performed as compared 
to other countries but not so much between the RMs and IPOs in Canada alone. This tells us 
something about RMs, they are viable but like most other companies might benefit from 
stricter regulations. 
Shell and merger characteristics 
In UK, the relative size of the acquiring company to the acquiree was found to make a 
difference in how well the firms performed. Larger acquirers did better post-merger. Although 
we did not cover this in our study, it is interesting to note because it could explain some of the 
differences in the RM performance. Also, as is the case for a majority of mergers, the 
acquired company (shell) receives most of the benefits of the merge. An interesting study was 
done in 2011 by Floros & Sapp in USA which focused on shells rather RMs. They found that 
the shell owners would have seen three-month abnormal returns of 48.1%. This was partly 
negated by the high risk of owning illiquid stocks. Floros & Sapp (2011) also analyze the 
characteristics of RM companies and find them to be small, young, and unprofitable.  
Sectors 
Another possible performance-driving factor not yet discussed is industry sectors. Only one 
study brings this up, although indirectly. As mentioned earlier, Brown, Ferguson & Lam 
(2010), found that RMs performed worse than their counterparts in Australia. They also 
noticed that RM deals were more prevalent among high-tech companies. We conjecture that 
one possible reason for the different outcomes between countries could be the sector fads at 
certain times. For example, the IT sector would have seen extreme growth during the 90s, as 
opposed to the industrial sector during the same time.  
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5.5 Critique and Limitations  
 
All studies have their shortcomings, which can be discussed and criticized. In order to allow a 
fair assessment of our results, we include them here. 
 Time frame 
 Different markets/industries 
 Population 
 Beta 
We use a time frame of ten years. During this time two major market crashes occurred. These 
extreme events are not likely to be repeated every decade, and the effects are unpredictable. A 
study from 2000 to 2010 is not necessarily comparable to other ten year event studies, e.g. a 
study performed from 1980 to 1990. Therefore it is hard to generalize in regards to the result. 
Additionally, a longer time-frame would yield a more conclusive result.  
 
Our data consists of companies that operate on different exchanges and as such there are 
different regulations when firms go public as well as different regulations when they are 
listed.  NASDAQ OMX and NGM have stricter requirements whereas Aktietorget and First 
North are more lax. The effects of these requirements have not been tested statistically; we 
graphed the BHAR means for each group to discern patterns but cannot say anything 
conclusive.  
 
We did not consider beta when matching companies to our samples of RMs and IPOs. In 
theory, high betas indicate higher performance and higher volatility when compared to a 
market index. Buying higher beta firms should therefore lead to better returns because the risk 
is higher. However, we do not think this would have led to different results in our study, as 
beta can be measured for different time periods and also changes over time, but it is worth 
mentioning.  
 
Population – We gathered practically the whole universe of undertaken RMs in the given time 
frame but the sample is still quite small. The variance of the groups is high so the confidence 
intervals had a large span as can be seen in the results. Consequently, the results are not as 
strong as we would have liked and they should be assessed with that in mind. This is the one 
weakness we believe might have enough of an effect to possibly change the outcome. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
We find no significant difference in RM and IPO performance in terms of BHARs. Therefore, 
RMs are a viable option and they should be considered a legitimate alternate means of going 
public, despite the bad reputation. This conclusion is based on a premise that long-term 
performance is a good indicator of what should and should not be allowed on the market. We 
think it is, since we believe that the market eventually values a company correctly over time. 
Ben Graham, known as Warrens Buffets mentor, once expressed it in the following way:  
 
"In the short-run, the market is a voting machine - reflecting a voter-registration test that 
requires only money, not intelligence or emotional stability - but in the long-run, the market is 
a weighing machine"  (Buffett & Cunningham, 2001). 
 
While we do hold some reservation about the results due to sample size and the clear negative 
results after the fifth month, previous studies in USA and UK have also come to the same 
conclusions we have.  As the reader may recall, the purpose of this study was two-fold. One 
was to measure and compare the actual BHARs, and the other was to identify factors 
influencing the performance for RMs if a difference was found.  We did not apply any 
regressions because there was no significant difference in the BHAR means. However, we 
found that previous studies indicate a number of possible factors that affect long-run abnormal 
returns positively: institutional ownership, liquidity of the stock, industry fads, difference in 
size of the merging companies, and regulatory requirements on different stock exchanges.  
 
Our findings on RMs should have some implications for the markets in Sweden. They have 
turned out to be sustainable investments, though volatile. As such, companies should not be 
afraid to use the method when it benefits them. The two most compelling reasons to us a RM 
as opposed to IPOs is the low price-tag and the shorter time it takes. Going back to the 
introduction, Candyking may have gone through with the IPO if investors had not reacted 
negatively. A longer timeframe increases the probability of negative events occurring. For 
In this chapter we present our conclusions of the study. We end with suggestions for further 
research. 
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RMs, the process is shorter and even if they do occur, decisions are made by the company 
itself and valuations are more likely to be rational.   
 
As for individual investors, RM companies are no better or worse off than any other but in our 
opinion each should be valued on its own individual merits before any investment is made. 
The high volatility of these stocks likely makes them unsuitable for all but the most intrepid  
investors.  
 
6.1 Suggestions for further research 
 
While writing this paper, we were made aware of a number of aspects in the subject that 
would be interesting to pursue further. One is the shell-company aspect of the RMs. It would 
be interesting to find out if the owners of the shell companies benefited from the RM and if a 
strategy of buying them as an investor would have been profitable. A regression with a 
number of independent variables like market-cap, price-to-book, trading activity, and 
institutional ownership for RMs and IPOs would also have been interesting in order to find 
out what drives long-term performance for each group. Also, a study using a larger time-span 
could be used for further research on RMs in Sweden.
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IPO bolag Datum (vid start) Marknad Market Cap Mkr  Bransch Bästa matchningsbolag Market cap 
Altero (DEAD) 2013-03-28 2005-10-21 Aktietorget 141,55 programvara Cortus energy (energi) 108,07
Procast Media AB (DEAD) 2011-02-23 2009-06-15 Aktietorget 30,43 Media/TV Swede resources (olja & gas) 29,82
Novus Group International 2007-06-01 aktietorget 24 Undersökningsftg Lucent Oil (separationsteknologi) 23,1
Railcare Group 2007-10-08 Aktietorget 134,75 järnvägsunderhåll Starbreeze (spelutvecklare) 116,23
James Concepts (DEAD) 2008-12-15 2007-11-20 Aktietorget 18,69 städhjälp Jojka communications (mobiltelefoni program/apps) 22,18
Biosensor Applications Sweden 2006-06-22 Aktietorget 43,43 bioteknik Amhult 2 B (fastighetsbolag) 39,48
Devicom (DEAD) 2011-4-29 2007-06-29 Aktietorget 13,62 Telefoni Transferator 'A' (investeringsföretag) 13,04
TravelPartner 2006-07-06 First North 113,86 internetresebyrå Stockwik Forvaltning (IT) 129,31
Trygga Hem Skandinavien AB 2008-05-27 First North 70,91 Larm DORO (mobiltelefoni) 87,04
Insplanet 2006-06-07 First North 170,41 Försäkringsförmedlare PREVAS B (IT) 158,92
Aqeri Holding 2005-04-25 First North 82 IT Fingerprint Cards (Industrivaror & Tjänster) 81,65
Cryptzone Group AB 2008-02-04 First North 44,28 IT ALLTELE ALLM.SVEN.TELAB (telekommunikation) 62,48
DTG Sweden 2007-12-14 First North 63 researrangör Multiq International (IT) 81,74
RusForest AB 2006-08-28 First North 474,48 Material MIDWAY Holdings 'A' (teknik & handelsföretag) 481,02
eWork Scandinavia AB 2008-05-22 First North 737,82 IT konsulter Oasmia Pharmaceutical (läkemedelsbolag) 732,57
Arena Personal (DEAD) 2009-2-5 2006-12-04 NGM equity 127,83 Bemanningsbolag Arcam (industrivaror) 200,7
Generic Sweden 2006-11-30 NGM equity 192,57 IT Paynova (IT) 413,41
Svenska Kaolin AB (DEAD) 2003-7-30 2001-12-25 NGM equity 6,48 gruvbolag MICRO SYSTEMATION (IT) 14,76
GuideLine Technology 2005-12-25 NGM equity 52,27 Geoteknologi Betting Promotion (dagligvaror, spel online) 27,65
Servage (DEAD) 2013-5-13 2005-06-29 NGM equity 21,51 IT Arcam (industrivaror) 13,18
Hebi Health Care AB (DEAD) 2009-7-10 2002-09-30 NGM equity 305,54 Läkemedel Obducat (industri) 269,94
Wayfinder Systems (DEAD) 2009-2-17 2005-10-21 NGM equity 558,41 industri GLYCOREX TRAN. Medecinteknik 465,47
Panaxia Security (DEAD) 2012-9-6 2006-07-19 NGM equity 164,35 Värdetransporter MICRO SYSTEMATION (IT) 163,02
Net Entertainment NE AB 2007-04-05 NGM equity 465,03 Utvecklar spelmjukvara Ginger Oil (prospektering) 424,3
Optimum Optik AB (DEAD) 2004-7-1 2001-11-05 NGM equity 11,5 optik Betting Promotion (dagligvaror, spel online) 31,38
3L System AB (DEAD) 2012-4-30 2001-09-24 NGM equity 26,38 IT konsult GLYCOREX TRAN. Medecinteknik 49,38
Panalarm (DEAD) 2009-3-2 2007-11-05 NGM equity 215,97 alarm Obducat (industri) 332,88
Commodity Quest 2006-06-12 NGM equity 215,82 Investeringsbolag Mertiva (hälsovård) 331,39
Biotech IGG 2005-12-21 NGM equity 29,06 konsulttjänster bioindustri NGS Group(bemanningsftg vård och skola) 30,42
Rejlers AB 2003-05-08 NGM equity 51,15 Industrivaror/tjänster LifeAssays (engånstester och utrustning för vården) 19,81
Mekonomen AB 2000-05-29 Nordiska Listan 729,19 Bildelar Traction 'B' (investmentbolag) 667,19
Hemtex AB 2005-10-06 Nordiska Listan 1863,16 detaljhandel CONCORDIA MARITIME 'B' (Tankrederi) 1705,46
Orexo AB 2005-11-09 Nordiska Listan 1194,5 Läkemedel Raysearch Labs 'B' (medicintekniskt) 1240,81
Rezidor Hotel Group 2006-11-28 Nordiska Listan 7800,1 Hotellföretag PA Resources 'B' (energi) 7228,60
Indutrade 2005-10-05 Nordiska Listan 2930 Industrivaror&tjänster Anoto Group (IT) 2749,30
Intrum Justitia AB 2002-06-07 Nordiska Listan 4 196,80 Finans & Fastighet CISION (industrivaror&tjänster) 3962,73
Beijer Electronics 2000-06-08 Nordiska Listan 559,89 Industrivaror&tjänster Geveko 'B' (industrivaror&tjänster) 577,5
Gunnebo Industrier AB (DEAD) 2008-10-02 2005-06-14 Nordiska listan 765,26 Industrivaror&tjänster OEM International 'B' (industrivaror&tjänster) 763,69
Kappahl AB 2006-02-23 Nordiska listan 4408,6 Dagligvaror Tradedoubler (dagligvaror) 3498,88
8 Appendices 
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Reverse Merger bolag Datum (vid start)Marknad Market Cap Mkr (vid start) Bransch Bästa matchningsbolag Market cap Mkr
Axlon Holding AB 2005-11-28 Aktietorget 244,35 Industri (manufacturing) Switchcore (IT) 286,99
Dacke 2005-02-17 Aktietorget 8,98 Marknadskommunikation Klick Data (IT) 10,4
Global Gaming Factory 2006-08-11 aktietorget 7,08 IT Conpharm B (läkemedel) 5,84
Hammar Invest 2007-03-07 Aktietorget 146,99 Array Hedson Techs (miljöteknik & leverantör 114,05
NRS Technologies 2005-08-09 Aktietorget 6,06 Industri återvinning Forsstrom high frequency (industri) 18,07
SnoWolverine 2009-09-03 Aktietorget 3,56 snöskoter tillverkning Trig media group (utveckla nätverksplattform 4,51
YCO Business Partner 2009-09-25 Aktietorget 4,11 Licenser Massolit Media 3,43
Caperio Holding 2008-11-17 First North 11,31 IT MSC Konsult (IT konsulter) 16,8
Dagon AB 2007-04-05 First North 14,14 Fastighetsförvaltning Ortivus A (Hälsovård) 16,63
Formpipe 2005-01-20 First North 11,31 IT Acap (Riskkapitalbolag) 5,62
Hifab Group AB 2008-12-03 First North 30,36 Projektledningsföretag Seamless Distribution (IT) 23,54
JLT mobile computers 2003-05-05 First North 46,36 IT Bergs Timber (Material) 47,51
Micro Holding 2006-01-20 First North 16,89 Detaljhandel MSC Konsult (IT konsulter) 30,89
Sagax AB 2004-07-22 First North 195,6 Fastighetsbolag Knowit (Konsult) 193,5
ALM Equity 2012-06-08 Först bequoted, nu First North RNB Retail and brands (butiker)
Exeotech(C 2 SAT) 2005-10-17 NGM equity 109,84 ? Ginger Oil (olja prospectering) 164,43
Avalon innnovation 2010-06-08 NGM equity 61,38 IT LifeAssays (engånstester och utrustning för vården 68,93
Bredband2 2003-09-15 NGM Equity 14 IT ARCAM AB (industrivaror, tjänster) 22,85
Central Asia Gold/Auriant Mining 2009-03-02 NGM equity 31,81 Gruvbolag Ginger Oil (olja prospectering) 30,83
Corem Property Group 2007-11-19 NGM equity 8,01 finans/fastighet NGS Group(bemanningsftg vård och skola) 28,16
Nordic Service Partners Holding AB 2005-10-28 NGM equity 115,04 Restaurang HEBI health care (läkemedel) 153,13
Oniva online Group 2006-08-28 NGM Equity 18 IT LifeAssays (engånstester och utrustning för vården 42,78
Precio Systemutveckling 2005-10-21 NGM equity 17,18 IT MICRO SYSTEMATION (IT) 15,68
Shelton Petroleum 2009-05-20 NGM Equity 23,97 Prospektering HEBI health care (läkemedel) 63,8
Sotkamo Silver 2010-08-23 NGM equity 79,13 Gruvbolag Obducat (industri) 69,92
Stille AB 2002-10-10 NGM Equity 84,58 medecinteknik GLYCOREX TRAN. Medecinteknik 112,38
Tatura 2007-07-01 NGM equity 10,22 olja/prospektering AIK FOTBOLL 92,40
TMG International AB 2005-05-31 NGM equity 317,74 Konsultbolag GLYCOREX TRAN. Medecinteknik 321,17
MVV Holding AB 2009-12-28 NGM Nordic MTF
Syrico 2001-10-12 NGM observation (jämf    7,66 Godis, konfektyr MICRO SYSTEMATION (IT) 19,94
Medcore AB 2009-07-01 Nordic MTF(NU PÅ FIRST NORTH
Balder Fastighet AB 2005-09-07 Nordiska listan 54,76 Fastigheter VITEC SOFTWARE GROUP (IT) 62,35
Din Bostad Sverige AB 2006-10-12 Nordiska listan 34,17 Fastigheter MIDSONA (kost och hälsa) 44,23
Biolin AB 2002-10-16 Nordiska listan 20,92 Hälsovård MIDSONA (kost och hälsa) 17,99
Entraction holding 2006-03-29 Nordiska listan 150,21 Poker online Duroc (Industrivaror) 149,87
LBI International AB 2006-08-01 Nordiska listan 1 168,86 IT konsulting ENEA (IT) 1187,66
Ledstiernan 2000-04-14 Nordiska Listan 176,11 Investeringsbolag MULTIQ INTERNATIONAL (IT) 149,97
Phonera AB 2006-09-20 Nordiska listan 229,37 Telefoni och IT ARCAM (industrivaror) 218,94
Klövern 2002-08-08 Nordiska listan 264,8 Fastigheter VBG GROUP (Sällanköpsvaror) 271,27
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Appendix II – Histograms for year 1 and 2 
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Appendix III – RM BHAR Mean confidence interval 
 
Appendix IV – IPO BHAR Mean confidence interval  
Month Mean SD Conf.Interval Lower limi Upper limit
1 3% 0,410 0,1340697 -10% 16%
2 1% 0,611 0,1996468 -19% 21%
3 1% 0,941 0,3073249 -30% 31%
4 7% 1,208 0,3947563 -32% 47%
5 5% 1,581 0,5165213 -46% 57%
6 7% 1,405 0,4588727 -39% 53%
7 -11% 1,136 0,3710249 -48% 26%
8 -14% 1,228 0,4009869 -55% 26%
9 -17% 1,148 0,3750448 -54% 21%
10 -17% 1,208 0,3944643 -56% 23%
11 -26% 1,189 0,3885351 -65% 13%
12 -24% 1,173 0,3830323 -63% 14%
13 -23% 1,249 0,4081576 -64% 18%
14 -29% 1,228 0,4010527 -69% 11%
15 -28% 1,320 0,4310910 -71% 15%
16 -24% 1,213 0,3963351 -64% 15%
17 -22% 1,122 0,3665101 -59% 15%
18 -29% 1,332 0,4350705 -73% 14%
19 -28% 1,378 0,4502695 -73% 17%
20 -27% 1,247 0,4073720 -68% 14%
21 -34% 1,475 0,4817602 -82% 14%
22 -41% 1,455 0,4753944 -88% 7%
23 -23% 1,438 0,4697555 -70% 24%
24 -19% 1,802 0,5886051 -78% 40%
25 -19% 1,474 0,4815662 -67% 30%
26 -18% 1,459 0,4766749 -65% 30%
27 -22% 1,323 0,4321668 -65% 21%
28 -25% 1,361 0,4445890 -70% 19%
29 -16% 1,429 0,4669355 -63% 30%
30 -8% 1,298 0,4241664 -50% 35%
31 -19% 1,251 0,4087617 -60% 22%
32 -25% 1,286 0,4201397 -67% 17%
33 -22% 1,264 0,4129798 -63% 20%
34 -26% 1,288 0,4206717 -68% 16%
35 -25% 1,301 0,4250697 -67% 18%
36 -29% 1,271 0,4151820 -70% 13%
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RM BHAR Mean for 36 months after the event takes place,
with 95% confidence intervals
The  confidence intervals all pass through zero, indicating that there is no significant difference 
between the RM companies and their matching companies, despite the distinct negative trend after 
the seventh month. Had the sample been larger perhaps that would change, as the confidence 
intervals then would have a shorter span.  With 90% signifcance the intervals also shorten but still 
only one drops below the zero line, month 22.
All but the first six months show negative BHAR means.
Month Mean SD Conf.Interval Lower limi Upper limit
1 -8% 0,66076 0,21584372 -29,98% 13,19%
2 -6% 0,76152 0,24875826 -31,32% 18,43%
3 0% 1,02802 0,33581322 -33,43% 33,73%
4 -2% 1,27861 0,41767028 -43,30% 40,23%
5 7% 1,19264 0,38958715 -31,53% 46,38%
6 4% 1,11171 0,3631535 -32,62% 40,01%
7 4% 1,22882 0,40140632 -35,88% 44,40%
8 9% 1,21323 0,39631482 -30,87% 48,39%
9 -2% 1,09988 0,35928695 -37,71% 34,14%
10 -3% 1,10356 0,3604906 -38,67% 33,43%
11 -2% 1,01022 0,32999753 -35,33% 30,67%
12 -10% 0,96187 0,31420366 -41,77% 21,07%
13 -7% 0,83715 0,27346384 -34,21% 20,48%
14 -4% 0,8233 0,2689402 -30,74% 23,04%
15 -8% 0,87326 0,28526051 -36,52% 20,53%
16 -10% 0,98283 0,32105134 -42,05% 22,16%
17 -17% 1,04866 0,34255642 -50,85% 17,66%
18 -15% 1,13408 0,370458 -52,27% 21,82%
19 -14% 1,10871 0,36217283 -50,24% 22,20%
20 -12% 1,21235 0,39602742 -51,47% 27,74%
21 -4% 1,28538 0,41988149 -46,28% 37,69%
22 -4% 1,68163 0,54932158 -58,66% 51,21%
23 -7% 1,31358 0,42909562 -49,52% 36,30%
24 -4% 1,31495 0,42954268 -46,98% 38,93%
25 -3% 1,26118 0,41197917 -44,52% 37,87%
26 -2% 1,28434 0,41954398 -44,09% 39,81%
27 -7% 1,18838 0,38819717 -45,79% 31,85%
28 -8% 1,28773 0,42065119 -49,86% 34,27%
29 -5% 1,23462 0,40330227 -45,19% 35,47%
30 0% 1,24793 0,40764847 -41,03% 40,50%
31 -1% 1,30065 0,42487229 -43,93% 41,04%
32 -7% 1,38691 0,45304774 -52,72% 37,89%
33 -6% 1,31179 0,42851103 -48,44% 37,26%
34 -3% 1,3496 0,44086063 -47,51% 40,66%
35 -3% 1,49041 0,48685734 -51,45% 45,93%
36 1% 1,46573 0,47879471 -46,98% 48,78%
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IPO BHAR mean for 36 months after the event takes place, 
with 95% confidence intervals
The confidence interval includes zero for all months, which leads us to not reject the null hypothesis that 
the means are equal. There also is no clear trend, although only five of the months show a mean above 
zero. We can conclude that IPOs have not underperformed the market at the 95% confidence level
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 Appendix V –  Confidence interval illustrating difference in means of RM and IPO BHAR 
means. 
 
month X1-X2 conf intervlower limiupper limit
1 11% 0,2541 -14% 37%
2 7% 0,31897 -25% 39%
3 1% 0,45522 -45% 46%
4 9% 0,57471 -49% 66%
5 -2% 0,64698 -67% 63%
6 3% 0,5852 -55% 62%
7 -15% 0,54662 -70% 39%
8 -23% 0,5638 -80% 33%
9 -15% 0,51938 -67% 37%
10 -14% 0,53438 -68% 39%
11 -24% 0,50977 -75% 27%
12 -14% 0,49543 -63% 36%
13 -16% 0,49131 -65% 33%
14 -25% 0,48289 -74% 23%
15 -20% 0,51694 -72% 31%
16 -14% 0,51006 -65% 37%
17 -5% 0,50168 -56% 45%
18 -14% 0,57143 -71% 43%
19 -14% 0,57786 -72% 44%
20 -15% 0,56816 -72% 42%
21 -30% 0,63907 -94% 34%
22 -37% 0,72648 -110% 36%
23 -17% 0,63625 -80% 47%
24 -15% 0,72869 -88% 58%
25 -15% 0,63376 -79% 48%
26 -16% 0,63502 -79% 48%
27 -15% 0,58093 -73% 43%
28 -17% 0,61206 -79% 44%
29 -12% 0,61701 -73% 50%
30 -8% 0,58831 -66% 51%
31 -17% 0,58959 -76% 42%
32 -18% 0,61789 -80% 44%
33 -16% 0,59514 -75% 44%
34 -23% 0,60937 -84% 38%
35 -22% 0,64632 -87% 43%
36 -30% 0,63375 -93% 34%
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CI for difference in means of RMs and IPOS at 95% significance level, for 
36 months
The graph above shows the confidence intervals for the difference in means of RM companies and IPO 
companies. Each interval for the 36 months includes zero which means the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
However, only five of the 36 show a positive BHAR and they are clustered around the first six months. Note that 
the confidence intervals are very large, which makes the comparison less useful than it would have been with a 
larger sample or lower standard deviation. 
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